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ABSTRACT
This paper identifies key issues surrounding the advisabilityand
practicality of adopting "target zones" for the exchangerates of major
currencies.
Four fundamental questions concerning the definitionof and the
rationale for target zones are addressed: first, what is generally
meant by a "target zone" approach to exchange rate managementand how
can "hard" and "soft" versions of this approachbe defined; second,
what are the perceived deficiencies in the existing exchange rate system
of managed floating which motivate the call for the adoptionof target
zones; third, how might target zones remedythese deficiencies; and
fourth, what factors are behind much of the skepticism overand
opposition to target zones?
In addition, the paper deals with a series of operational questions
of a more technical nature that weigh heavily on the practicalityof
implementing a target zone approach. The issuesdiscussed include the
following: how would the target zones be calculated; whatcurrencies
would be included in the system of target zones; how wideshould the
target zones be and how frequently should they berevised; and what
policy instruments would be employed to keepactual exchange rates
within the target zones, and with what consequences for other policy
objectives?
The purpose of the paper is not to make the case eitherfor or
against the adoption of target zones. Rather, theintention is to
raise and discuss factors that should be considered in anyserious
discussion of the topic.
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This paper identifies key issues surrounding the advisability and
practicality of adopting "target zones' for the exchange ratesof major
currencies. 1
At present there are wide differences of view on the subject of
target zones. This reflects at least three factors: first,different
assessments of the performance of the existing exchange rate systemof
managed floating; second, different evaluations of whether a systemof
target zones could remedy the perceived weaknesses of the existing
system; and third, different conceptions of the preferredform of
target zones.
The purpose of this paper is not to make the case either for or
against the adoption of target zones. Indeed, we havetried to avoid
expressing our own view on this central issue. Rather, theintention
is to raise and discuss factors that should be considered in anyserious
examination of the topic. As such, the paper not only outlines potential
strengths and weaknesses of various versions of the target zoneapproach
but also confronts operational questions thai would have to be facedif
the target zone approach to exchange rate management were adopted.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I addresses four funda-
mental questions concerning the definition of and therationale for
target zones: first, what is generally meant by a targetzone approach
to exchange rate management and how can "hard" and"soft" versions of
this approach be defined; second, what are the perceived deficienciesin
the existing exchange rate system which motivate the call for the adoption—2—
of target zones; third, how might target zones remedy thesedeficiencies;
and fourth, what factors are behind much of the skepticism over and
opposition to target zones?
Section II deals with a series of operational questions and issues
of a more technical and specific nature that weigh heavilyon the practi-
cality of implementing a target zone approach. The issues discussed are
the following: how would the target zones be calculated; what currencies
would be included in the system of target zones; how wide should the
target zones be and how frequently should they be revised; and what
policy instruments would be employed to keep actual exchange rates within
the target zones, and with what consequences for other policy objectives?
A brief postcript appears as Section III of the paper.
Finally, three caveats relevant to the nature and scope of this
study should be mentioned. First, there should be no presumption that
advocates of target zones see this as the only proposal for improving
exchange rate stability. Indeed, most advocates of target zones would
also rely on stronger surveillance of a broader nature to help reach
that objective. Second, since the paper does not attempt tocompare
the target—zone proposal to other proposals for improving exchangerate
stability, there should likewise be no presumption that the strengths
and weaknesses outlined here are more or less significant than those
associated with other proposals. 2 Third, since many of the precise
operational features of a system of target zones remain largely
conjectural (e.g., which currencies would be included, how target zones—3—
would be calculated, etc.), the views expressed on these operational
features should be seen more as aids to discusssion and debate than as
definite conclusions.
1.TheMeaning and Rationale for Target Zones
1.1: Whataretarget zones?
Target zones mean different things to different people. Perhaps
the easiest way to think of them is as a hybrid exchange rate systemthat
combines some of the attributes and characteristics of both pegged and
flexible exchange rate systems. 3
A. Row does a system of target zones differ from other exchange
regimes?
Target zones differ from a pure system of clean floating inthat the
authorities are permitted (and indeed are likely) to intervene inthe
exchange market, and, more generally, are encouraged "to take aview" on
the desirable level of the exchange rate. Target zones differ fromthe
present system of managed floating in at least two principal respects:4
(i) the authorities establish a target zone for the exchange rate
for some future period; and (ii) the authorities are expected to keep
more of an "eye" on the exchange rate in the conductof monetary policy
so as to keeptheactual exchange rate within the target zone. 5
Compared to the adjustable peg system, target zonesneed not entail a
formal commitment to intervene in all circumstances in the exchange
market to keep actual rates within the zone.Indeed, the only concrete
intervention guideline that is typically mentioned is that the author-
ities refrain from "destabilizing intervention," that is, buyingtheir4—
owncurrencywhen it is above the top of the zone andselling it below
the bottom of the zone. This specificguideline was also included in
the Fund's 1974 "Guidelines for theManagement of Floating Kxchange
Rates." 6 Finally, target zones differ froma pure system of rigidly
fixed exchange rates in that, in additionto the lack of a formal inter-
vention obligation, the zones themselves are to beoccasionally reviewed
and changed if deemed necessary.
B. Flow can "hard" and "soft" versions oftarget zones be defined?
In general, various versions of target zones can bedistinguished
by reference to the following four characteristics:
(1) width of the target zone (outside of which theexchange rate
is viewed as "out of line"),
(ii) the frequency of changes in the targetzones,
(iii)thedegree of publicity given to the zones; in this context,
one nay distinguish between public announcement of thetarget zones and
confidential disclosure in official circles (forpurposes of exchange rate
surveillance, intervention, multilateral policy coordination, andconsultation),
that is, "loud zones" versus "quiet zones," and
(iv) the degree of commitment to keeping exchange rateswithin
the zone.
Obviously, these characteristics define a spectrum of possible
approaches to target zones. At one end, a "hard" version oftarget
zones night entail a monetary policy that is heavily gearedto
maintaining the exchange rate within the narrow, infrequentlyrevised,
and publicly announced zone. At the other end of thespectrum, lies—5—.
a "soft" version of target zones that might be characterized by a
monetary policy paying only limited attention to the level of the
exchange rate; and by zones that are wide, frequentlyrevised, and
kept confidential. The hard and soft poles, in turn, may serve as
useful benchmarks for the analysis and evaluation of intermediate
versions of target zones.
The hard version of target zones shares some of the attributes of
the existing European Monetary System (EMS).In particular, hard target
zones can be considered a close relative of the EMS's fixed but adjustable
rates with narrow margins and a "divergence indicator.' However,unlike
the EMS, hard target zones do not entail a formal commitment for exchange
rate intervention; nor need there he an analogue to the creditfacilities
of the EMS. The soft version of target zones differs from existing
Fund surveillance procedures (e.g., the requirement for reporting real
exchange rate changes in excess of 10 percent to the Executive Board)
in that the former introduces a more explicit and formal frameworkfor
defining the appropriate pattern of exchange rates and for establishing
the links between exchange rates and macroeconomic policies.7
1.2: What considerations underlie the call for the adoption of target
zones?
Proponents of target zones proceed from two basic perceptions:
first, that the present system of managed floating has exhibitedserious
deficiencies; and second, that the adoption of a system of target zones
could remedy at least some of these deficiencies. Mtong the alleged
deficiencies, the most attention has been paid to the following
considerations:—6—
A. Exchange rates have been highly volatile andunpredictable
Whether measured in real or nominalterms, bilateral or effective
terms, the short—run variability of exchange-rates over theperiod of
managed floating has been high——indeed, significantlyhigher than during
the previous Bretton Woods system. Inaddition, most exchange rate changes
have been unpredictable (as suggesEedby market indicators like forward
exchange rates). While high short—term volatility andunpredictability
of exchange rates is usually deemed to be lessserious than longer—term
"misalignnents; this volatility is still regarded ascostly because it
generates uncertainty, and hence leads to lower levels ofinvestment and
trade. Further, developing countries arealleged to be especially
hurt by this volatility because they do not havewell—developed financial
markets (particularly forward cover arrangements).
B. Exchange rates of major currencies have beensubject to large
and persistent misalignments
A second complaint against the presentsystem is that exchange
rates of major currencies have been subject to large andpersistent
"misalignments" over the past dozen years. Such misalignmentsare
commonly measured by cumulative departures from purchasingpower parity,
or by the sheer magnitude of changes in real exchange ratesthemselves,
or by departures from more comprehensive concepts of theequilibrium"
real exchange rate (e.g., the exchange rate thatyields a cyclically
adjusted current account balance equal to normal net privatecapital
flows). Not surprisingly, charges of misalignmentwere particularly
pronounced over the period 1981—85. A representative estimate ofmis-
alignment is provided by Williamson (1985). lIe estimatedthat by the—7—
end of 1984 the extent of misalignment in the realeffective exchange
rate was 39 percent (overvaluation) for the U.S. dollar and19 percent
(undervaluation) for the Japanese yen. Such misalignmentsare, in turn,
deemed costly because they have an adverseimpact on resource allocation,
induce adjustment costs (including unemployment), distortoptimal levels
of capital formation, andencourage protectionism.
C. Under the existing exchange rate system, macroeconomicpolicies
in major industrial countries have beenundisciplined and
ordinated
Perhaps the chief criticism by the proponents oftarget zones
is that the existing system of floating exchange rates lacksan effective
mechanism for ensuring policy discipline and coordination. 8As support-
ing evidence, the critics cite, inter alia, the doubling of industrial—
country average inflation rates as between 1963—72 and 1973—85, and the
tripling of the ratio of industrial countries' government fiscal deficits
to GNP over the same period. On lack of coordination,they point to the
frequent conflicts among the major industrial countries on both thestance
and mix of macroeconomic policies, as well as on the needfor structural
reform. Also, despite the efforts made at coordination, criticsemphasize
the absence of binding agreements during the floating—rateperiod on
either rates of monetary expansion or exchange ratenorms. Undisciplined
and uncoordinated policies, in turn, are said to becostly because such
behavior is incompatible with financial stability andsustainable growth,
and also because such policies are the main drivingforce behind both
short—term volatility and longer—term misalignment ofexchange rates.—8—
D. TMF surveillance under the existing exchange rate system has been
largely ineffective in respect of major industrial countries,
resulting in asymmetry in the international adjustment mechanism
Yet a fourth alleged weakness of the existing system is thatFund
surveillance has not been sufficiently effective in respect of the very
tndustrial countries whose policies have the most significant "spillover
effects' on the world economy, thereby producing, among other things, an
asymmetric distribution in the burden of adjustment. Asevidence for this
position, the critics cite the magnitude and persistence of current account
imbalances in the United States and Japan, especially over the past three
years. The seeming inability of surveillance to bringabout a correction
of the structural U.S. budget deficit is regarded as another striking
example of this lack of symmetry. Further, it is argued that an Inap-
propriate mix of macroeconomic policies in the majorindustrial countries
during the early l9SOs resulted in high real interest rates and in sluggish
economic activity. A consequence of this was that developing countries
faced (during 1981—83) a sharp increase in debt service requirements,
a significant decline in export earnings, a compressionof their imports,
and unusually slow growth. Thus, so it is argued, adverse spillover
effects from poor policies in industrial countries were substantial,
and the burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on the developing
countries.
1.3: How would the introduction of target zones for the major currencies
remedy these four perceived deficiencies of the existing exchange
rate system?
A central argument advanced by proponents of target zones (see,for
example, Roosa (1984)) is that their introductionwould restore some of—9—
the useful characteristics of the Bretton Woods system without being
subject to the flaws that led to the collapse of that system.
A. Restoring an anchor for medium—term exchange rate expectations
Tt is often argued that one reason why exchange rates have been
o volatile under the present exchange rate system is that market partici-
pants lack an 'anchor' for medium—term expectations about exchange rates.
In such an environment, new information, rumors, or announcements can lead
to large revisions of expectations about the future which in turn induce
"large" changes in current exchange rates. Furthennore, under some
circumstances, such events may set the stage for the emergence of band-
wagon" effects and speculative "bubbles" that can dominate the evolution
of the exchange rate and divorce it increasingly from "fundamentals".
It is claimed that target zones will reduce exchange rate volatility
and misalignment on two counts. First, the obligation (albeit an informal
one) or the intention to keep the exchange rate within the zone provides
market participants with useful information about the likely conduct of
future macroeconomic policies, especially monetary policy. The easier it
is to nake an informed judgment about the future course of policies, the
less one can expect the erroneous extrapolation of short—tern events and
the more forgiving will be the market of short—term deviations of policy.
Second, the publication of target zones provides market participants
with Information on the authorities' collective estimate of future equi-
librium exchange rates. Therefore, it is said to reduce the risk that
market participants use the "wrong model" in translating (even perfectly
foreseen) future policy changes into forecasts of future exchange rates.— 10—
B.Restoring discipline and coordination to the conduct of
economic policies
Target zones are said to restore discipline to macroeconomic
policymaking for two reasons. First, if exchange rates are maintained
within the target zones, then macroeconomic policies, again particularly
monetary policy, are disciplined by the exchange rate constraint. Second,
even if the authorities opt to alter the target zone rather than their
policies, they would still be obliged both to negotiate a new zone and
to explain why a new zone is appropriate. These obligations themselves
are said to introduce stronger peer pressure into policy formation.
Turning to the coordination of policies, the following points are
noteworthy. First, the very fact that a system of target zones has to be
negotiated and must display mutual consistency of cross exchange rates is
said to enhance the degree of international policy coordination. Under a
system of target zones, so it is argued, the exchange rate implications
of alternative stances and mixes of policies would be directly confronted,
thereby ending the undesirable current practice whereby exchange rates
emerge as a "residual of other policy actions of individual countries.
Also, the requirement that target zones be negotiated and mutually agreed
is said to reduce the risk of competitive devaluations.
And to the extent that target zones do restore discipline and
coordination to the conduct of macroeconomic policy, they will reduce
misalignment and volatility of exchange rates.— 11—
C.Increasing the effectiveness of IMFsurveillanceand reducing
the asymmetry in the adjustment process
Proponents of target zones argue that the need to negotiate,
to ensure consistency, and to revise the zones could provide a natural
focal point for multilateral Fund surveillance. Just as important, such
surveillance procedures when applied to target zones will be aimed at
the policies of the najor industrial countries that, in turn, are likely
to constitute the membership of the target zone system. It is alleged
therefore that target zones will remove the Achilles heel of the present
surveillance procedures, namely, the inability to effect a meaningful
change in policies of large industrial countries. Since the asymmetry
of adjustment is said to depend critically on policy behavior in industrial
countries, more effective surveillance of them would also produce more
symmetrical adjustment.
the remedial properties of a target zone approach would obviously
depend on the particular version adopted. The "harder" versions, by
virtue of being closer images of the Bretton Woods regime, clearly offer
a stronger dose of external pressure on domestic policy. But, asis
discussed in subsequent sections, the alleged benefits associated with
the harder versions may also entail higher costs.
Proponents of the "softer" versions of the target zone approach
argue that their adoption would enhance thesurveillance process for at
least three reasons. First, even if the zones were wide and were frequently
revised, they would exert some disciplinary force on the most flagrant and
persistent cases of inappropriate policies. Thus, while soft target zones— 12—
maynot do much to catch niisalignments on the order of 10 percent or less,
they will, so their supporters argue, catch the 20—40 percent realexchange
rate misaligmBents that do most damage to the system. Second, even if the
zones were not announced to the public, they still are likely to provoke
helpful discussion and analysis of policy interdependenceamong officials
of participating members. Also, such "quiet' zonesprovide another channel
for peer pressure against inappropriate policies. Third, since the Fund1s
current practices in any case involve evaluating the appropriateness
of members' exchange rates, supporters argue that even unpublishedzones
may prove useful in generating a more concrete framework for evaluating
exchange rate implications of alternative macroeconomic policies.
D. Escaping the same fate as the Bretton Woods system
Supporters of target zones acknowledge that many of the factors
associated with the collapse of Bretton Woods have notgone away (e.g.,
high international mobility of capital, larger financial resources for
private speculators than for central banks, existence of large and
suddenly changing interest rate differentials across countries, etc.).
Nevertheless, they contend that a system of target zones can survive
pressure from "hot money" flows. They argue that so long as policy
adjustments are made when necessary or so long as the target zones are
revised frequently to reflect inflation differentials and needs for real
exchange rate adjustment, expectations of large and discontinuous exchange
rate adjustments that provide the motive for speculative attacks will
seldom arise. Tn their view, the viability of the EMS providestestimony— 13—
thatit is possible to operate an adjustable peg system inthe 1980s
provided that there is sufficient political commitment,active exchange
market intervention policies, and a presumptive indicatorfor adjustment.
Since a target zone system shares many of these characteristics,it too
is viable. 9
1.4: What factors are behind much of the skepticism aboutand opposition
to target zones?
Opposition to the adoption of target zones stemsfrom a more sanguine
appraisal of the performance of the existing system,doubts about the
capacity of target zones to remedy alleged deficiencies,and concerns
that target zones would introduce new problems. Eachof these elements
is discussed in turn.
A. Has the existing system failed?
Exchange rate volatility. While the short—run volatilityof
both nominal and real exchange rates has indeed been high duringthe
period of managed floating, this begs the questionof whether that
volatility was •excessive." In this connection, opponentsof target
zones raise twopoints.
First, the period since 1973 has witnessed greatturbulence in the
world economy and great uncertainty about the future courseof economic
and political events. In this environment, all asset prices,not only
exchange rates, have shown high volatility. In fact,exchange rate
changes have been smaller than changes in pricesof other assets (e.g.,
national stock market prices, changes in short-tertflinterest rates,
changes in commodity prices). As such,conclusions about the excessive
nature of exchange rate fluctuations depend uponthe specific yardstick
selected.— 14—
Second,they note that there is an intrinsic difference between
asset prices on the one hand andwages and goods prices on the other
hand. The former are auction prices thatdepend heavily on expectations
about the future whereas the latterare more sticky in the short run,
reflecting in large part contractualarrangements made in the past.
Thus, wages and prices of nationaloutput may not serve as a proper
yardstick for assessing exchange ratevolatility. Indeed, some would
say that it is precisely because wages and pricesare so slow to adjust
to current and expected economic conditions thatit is desirable to allow
for "excessive" adjustment inexchange rates.
As regards the unpredictable nature ofexchange rate changes under
the present system, opponents oftarget zones note that the foreign
exchange market is one in which risk can be coveredrelatively easily
(via access to forward markets, optionsmarkets, etc.). For this reason,
it is argued thatitmay be preferable to concentrate the disturbances in
this market rather than transfer them to othermarkets, such as labor
markets, where dealing with them would be more difficult.
Turning to the cost of short—run volatility of exchangerates,
opponents point to the sporadic nature of the evidence linkingexchange
rate volatility to the volume of international trade andinvestment. 10
They also argue that it is doubtful that thesystem of pegged rates
could have survived in the turbulent environment of thepast 15 years
without severe limits on trade and capital movementsbeing imposed by
many countries. 11Such restrictions on trade and capitalflows, in— 15—
turn,could well have been more costly for theworld economy than the
short—run volatility of exchangerates experienced under the present
system.
Exchange rate misalignment. Almost all observers,even many
staunch opponents of target zones,agree that there have been serious
misalignnertts of major currency exchangerates during the past few years,
particularly as regards the sharp real appreciation of the U.S.dollar.
Opponents of target zones suggest however that inevaluating both the
extent and the cost of such misalignments several factorsought to be
recognized.
Changes in real economic conditions requiringadjustments in the
relative prices of different nationaloutputs occur all the time
(continuing intercountry differences in growth of laborproduc-
tivity, permanent changes in the terms of trade,intercountry shifts
in both the marginal productivity ofcapital and the propensity to
save, etc.). Under a system of pegged rates, relative priceadjust-
ments are achieved through the slow changes of nationalprice levels and
through occasional changes of parity. Under floatingrates, adjustments
in the relative price of different nationaloutputs occur rapidly and in
anticipation of changes in economic conditions rather than afterthe
need for adjustment has become apparent. In theabsence of an explicit
specification of relative costs, there is no generalpresumption that
slow adjustment of relative prices is preferableto rapid adjustment,
or that price adjustments should not occur inanticipation of events
requiring such adjustments. Hence, what nay seem to bemisalignments
may in part represent equilibrating changes.— 16—
Criticsof target zones argue that one should not overlookthe
fact that significant misalignment of major currency exchange rates
also occurred during the Bretton Woods period, especiallyin its later
years. In this connection, they cautionthat misalignment of real
exchange rates can derive from too little nominal exchangerate flexi-
bility as well as from too much. The frequencyof misaligned real
exchange rates in countries with "pegged" exchange arrangements,where
there is often a reluctance to alter nominal rates in theface of
large inflation differentials, should stand as a warningto the dangers
involved.
The size of estimated misalignments in major currency exchange
rates is, according to defenders of the present system,highly uncertain.
To take but one example, calculations of misalignment done byWilliamson
(1985) and others are strongly affected by the assumptionthat 'normal'
net capital flows are zero for the United States. This assumptionis
important because the equilibrium exchange rateis defined in such calcu-
lations as the exchange rate that would produce a currentaccount balance
equal to the assumed normal net private capitalflow. But a country
that is a "normal" net capital exporter under one setof macroeconomic
policies, tax considerations, and political eventsabroad may become a
natural importer under others. In this connection, a judgmentthat
normal net private capital flows for the United States were, say,a
$30 billion annual inflow (to reflect high expectedprofitability,
relatively low domestic savings, and safe—havenconsiderations) rather
than zero would reduce the estimated misalignment considerably;
12— 17—
yetthe theoretical reasons for preferring the latterestimate to the
former are, so the critics argue, debatable at best.
Defenders of the present system argue that explanationsthat
attribute long—term misalignment to a speculativebubble are highly
questionable. They point out that the (narrow)theoretical models that
are frequently used to generate a speculativebubble in the exchange
rate (i.e., a fully expected continuous price changenot justified by
fundamentals) also imply that such a bubble could prevailfor only a
short period of time——certainly not for five years or so.
Discipline and coordination. Defenders of thecurrent exchange
rate system question the allegation that it exertsless discipline than
regimes with greater fixity of exchange rates.As a theoretical matter,
it is pointed out that changes in exchanges rates arehighly visible and
are transmitted promptly into domestic prices.As a result, the conse-
quences of undisciplined macroeconomicpolicies are readily apparent. In
contrast, undisciplined policies underfixed exchange rates show up only in
reserve changes, and then usually becomepublic only after a significant
delay. Therefore, it is argued, the supposed superiordisciplining force
of a fixed rate regime is not obvious. Furthermore, asan empirical
matter, the 1979—86 policy experience inindustrial countries can be
viewed as evidence that anti—inflationary discipline canbe restored
without fixed exchange rates. Indeed, the decelerationin growth rates
of narrow and broad money that took place in theface of high unemployment
in most of the major industrial countries in 1979—82coincided with
relatively high variability of both nominaland real exchange rates.— 18—
Asfor coordination, defenders of thepresent system note that
there have been some successful
coordination efforts during the past
decade. In this context, they mention theU.S. dollar support package
of November 1, 1978, agreementson short—tenn exchange ratemanagement
policies (e.g., intermittent jointcountering of disorderly market
conditions) ,theagreements of the Bonn economic summit of 1978, and
the Group of Five agreement (ofSeptember 22, 1985) in New York on
foreign exchange intervention and otherpolicies. 13
In addition, it can be argued that theoptimal degree of coordi-
nation is less than complete. Forexample, the perception of independent
monetary policy may be necessary in some countries forsustaining confidence
that monetary policy will not beinflationary in the long run (particularly
if not all potential partners ina target zone system have a track record
of consistently soundmonetary policy). 14
In sum, the very point of departure for theprojionents of target
zones, namely, the overall appraisal that theexisting system has failed,
is itself not universallyaccepted. Opponents of target zones acknowledge
that the present system has weaknessesbut do not see these weaknesses
as more serious than those demonstrated by earliersystems.In addition,
opponents emphasize that the present system has demonstratedsome "valuable
strengths.' Specifically, exchange rate changesare viewed as having made
a positive contribution to securing effectiveexternal payments adjust-
ment over the medium to long run. The presentsystem is also credited
with having maintained a mechanism of conflictresolution (namely, the
foreign exchange market) that has not involved eithersuspension of—19—
currency convertibility or large—scale restrictionson trade and capital
flows; indeed, supporters of thepresent system claim that floating
rates allowed the removal of certain
restrictions. Furthermore, it is
argued that independent monetarypolicy, facilitated by the existing
exchange rate system, permitted the applicationof successful disinfla-
tionary policies. Finally, it isargued that no exchange rate regime
would have emerged unscathed from thecombination of shocks, portfolio
shifts, and structural and institutionalchanges that occurred during
the years of nanaged floating.
B. Would the introduction oftarget zones improve matters?
(1) Would target zones providean anchor? As noted earlier, one of
the central arguments for the introductionof target zones is that such
zones would provide an anchor for medium—termexchange rate expectations.
But would it, and at what costs?Skeptics make the following points.
If the absence of an anchor stems from lack ofinformation
about future governmentpolicies, then it is not clear that publication
of target zones, rather thanannouncement of the future course of policies
themselves, is the preferred way to provide thatinformation. Obviously,
if the zones are not published(i.e., quiet zones), then their adoption
will not alleviate the policyuncertainty problem at all. 15
If the source of uncertainty is that marketparticipants do
not possess information on the modellinking government policies with
the consequent levels of exchangerates, then target zones (loud zones)
do indeed provide the missing information.
This presupposes, however,
eitherthat the government has superior informationabout the "true—20—
model" or that the government carries enough credibilityto convince
market participants that it will adjustits policies to consistently
maintain exchange rates within the announced zone (i.e.,it will adjust
its policies to make the exchange rate forecast cometrue). Opponents
of target zones see no evidence that governments havesuch superior
information or knowledge about such a model. Further, theypoint out
that experience with preannounced exchange rate targetsin Latin America
suggests that countries would probablyfind it difficult to adhere to
such targets. 16
Even if the target zones were credible for some periodof
time, critics argue that the occasionalneed for revision of the target
zones will invite the same type of one—waybet for speculators that
ultimately felled the Bretton Woods system. Of course,since govern-
ments are not formally committed to defend the target zones,they may
choose to allow exchange rates to depart fromthe zone (while subsequently
announcing a revised zone). But in that case,the zones themselves would
soon lose their credibility.
Even if the zones are announced, criticscontend that "soft"
versions of target zones characterized bywide and frequently revised
zones are not likely to provide a strongand reliable anchor because
they will not sufficiently narrow expectationsabout the future rate.
Yet such wide and frequently revised zones aresaid to be necessary (by
critics) to account for our measure of ignoranceabout the equilibrium
exchange rate and for changing real conditions.— 21—
Evenif theanchoriscredibleanddurable,itsintroduction
may be costly. The argument here is that the volatility or misalignment
of exchange rates is not the likely source of difficulties but rather a
manifestation of the prevailing package of macroeconomic policies.
Without introducing a significant change into the conduct of policies, a
manipulation of exchange rates to satisfy the zones may not improve
matters at all. In fact, the absence of the exchange rare as a market
gauge for assessing policies will then only confuse mattersand reduce
the information essential for policymaking.
(2) Would target zones provide discipline? It is widely agreed
that misalignment of real exchange rates arises to a large extent from
undisciplined and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies. Hence, the
ability of target zones to reduce misalignment rests in good measure on
their ability to enhance discipline. Skeptics put forward the following
arguments.
Experience suggests to them that national governments are
unlikely to adjust appreciably the conduct of domestic policies so as to
satisfy the constraints imposed by the exchange rate regime. Rather, it
is argued, it is more likely that the exchange rate regime adjusts to
whatever discipline national governments choose to have. As an illustra-
tion, it is pointed out that other external pressures aimed at restoring
discipline to policy in major industrial countries (e.g., individual
Article IV consultations, Fund Executive Board discussions of the world
economic outlook, Group of Five surveillance meetings, OECD country
reports) have met with only limited success. Why then should target
zones succeed where other similar measures have produced suchlimited
results?— 22—
Evidencefrom earlier periods during which exchange rates were
more rigid does not suggest that greater fixity of exchange rates
induced either lower average external imbalances, or more rapid adjust-
ment of such imbalances, or greater symmetry of adjustment as between
either surplus and deficit countries, or between reserve and nonreserve
currency countries. 17 Why then should target zones provide the impetus
to discipline when exchange regimes with greater formal commitment have
not consistently done so?
• In a related vein, it is argued that by focusing attention on
exchange rates rather than on the root cause of misalignment, namely,
the stance and mix of macroeconomic policies, onemay lessen the pressures
for corrective action on the ultimate sources of the problem.
Critics argue that if the nominal target zones reflect rigid
targets for real exchange rates, they can destabilize the price level. 18
Thke, for example, the case of a country that experiences an unexpected
wage push that raises its price level relative to that abroad. Its real
exchange rate will then have appreciated relative to its initial level.
If the authorities attempt to restore the original real exchange rateby
announcing a more depreciated nominal target zone, then the implied
expansion in monetary policy (needed to keep the actual exchange rate
within the new target zone) will increase the price level. In short,
critics warn that while a rigid real exchange rate may he helpful for
preventing trade balance deteriorations due to eroding competitiveness,
it can also present new dangers for controlling inflation. Morebroadly,
monetary policy is not the appropriate policy response to all types of
disturbances.— 23—
Criticspoint out that while target zones can supply inform-
ation on intercountry divergences in policy, they do not provide guidance
on the right stance of policy within a country. For example, if two
countries each have inflation rates of 10 percent, the exchange rate
may be stable but few would argue that monetary policy in either country
was appropriate. Again, so the critics argue, target zones do not ensure
discipline.
(3) Would target zones enhance coordination and strengthen
surveillance? In appraising the effects of the adoption of target zones
on policy coordination and on Fund surveillance, skeptics make the follow-
ing observations.
Whatever the exchange rate regime, there are strong barriers
to coordination for at least two reasons: (1) exchange rates are by their
very nature •competitive" in the sense that one country's gain is frequent-
ly another country's loss; (ii) various compromises on growth, inflation,
and income distribution at the national level often leave little room for
further compromise on policies at the international level. 19 Target
zones, so say their critics, cannot overcome these barriers.
The process of negotiating target zones could produce
dangerous frictions among the negotiating parties and could lead ultimately
to a reduced level of coordination in this and other areas.
ate cannot rule out the possibility that the cumbersome nego-
tiation of target zones would land the system back in the management— 24—
delaysof the latter days of the Bretton Woods system, with adverse
effects on the desired flexibility of real exchange rates. With
target zones, one loses the "safety valve" provided by the marketplace
for foreign exchange as a mode of conflict resolution.
To the extent that the adoption of target zones results in
a significant loss in independence in the conduct of domestic monetary
policy, the authorities may be tempted to adopt discriminatory trade
practices and other measures of protection in order to compensate for
the loss of a powerful policy instrument.
The use of target zones as a possible focal point for Fund
surveillance raises three related potential problems. First, the use of
the exchange rate as a primary indicator of disequilibria in macroeconomic
policies could send misleading signals. Critics note that the more
general Fund practice as applied to adjustment programs and financial
programing is to employ a whole set of macroeconomic indicators for
diagnostic purposes. Would exchange rate movements vis—'—vis the target
zone constitute a "sufficient statistic" for monitoring macroeconomic
policies? If one believes that the answer to that question is negative,
then orienting Fund surveillance around that single indicator, in addition
to possibly diverting attention from the root causes of disequilibria,
may jeopardize the quality of surveillance,
The second problem raised by skeptics is that the target zone
approach is agnostic about which policy instruments should be used to
respond to departures of exchange rates from the zone. The usual pre-
sumption is that it will be monetary policy. 20 However, if the root
cause of the disequilibrium is an inappropriate monetary—fiscal policy— 25—
nix,then an excessive emphasis on monetary policy could produce compliance
with the target zones and yet leave the fundamental problem unsolved.
In short, critics argue that the calculation of the target zones
would have to be based on an appropriate and broad set of indicators
to avoid sending false signals about both the need for adjustraent and
the appropriate corrective measures.
Third, critics contend that target zones do not resolve the problem
of how to allocate and enforce the burden of adjustment among member
countries. When more than one member's (effective) exchange rare leaves
the zone, it will be necessary to specify who does what if an effective
and coordinated policy response is to take place. But target zones, so
the critics argue, offer no solution to this "14—1 problem."
(4) Could target zones escape the fate of the Bretton Woods
system?
Opponents of the target zone approach to exchange rate manage-
ment remain unconvinced that target zones could escape the fate of Bretton
Woods. They make essentially three arguments. First, technological ad-
vances in transferring funds across national boundaries, in combination
with absence of parallel growth in official reserves, mean that the
capital mobility problem (hot money flows) is now even more formidable
than in the early 1970s. Second, difficulties associated with negotiat-
ing mutually—consistent target zones would as before produce large discon-
tinuous changes in exchange rates, thus motivating strong speculation.
In addition, if the timing of exchange rate changes were done unpredic-
tably to prevent such speculation, this would destroy the raison d'tre— 26—
ofthe target zone scheme itself. Third, the viability of the EMS owes
much to the unusual political commitment behind it, to capital controls
imposed by some members, and to the structural characteristics of its
members. 21 None of these factors would, according to the critics, neces-
sarily transfer to an exchange rate arrangement among a larger and more
heterogeneous group of countries. As such, to them, the viability of
the EMS does not imply much about the viability or desirability of a
target zone system.
II. Operational Questions Associated with the Possible Implementation
of Target Zones
11.1: How would the target zones be calculated?
An important implicit assumption in the target zone approach to
exchange rate management is that the authorities can approximate the
equilibrium (real) exchange rate to a useful degree. But by what methods
or techniques? Three methods deserve explicit consideration.
The first is the purchasing—power—parity (PPP) approach. If the
authorities can identify a base period when the country was in
external balance, then the equilibrium value for the nominal exchange
rate in the current period is the value of the exchange rate in the base
period adjusted for the intercountry difference in inflation rates
between the current and base periods. This is equivalent to restoring
the value of the real exchange rate in the base period. Since the real
exchange rate, in turn, is often viewed as a measure of the country's• —27—
competitive position, the PPP approach can be regarded as an analysis
of competitiveness as well.
Theexchange rate used for such calculations would typically be
an indexof effective exchange rates using bilateral trade weights or
nore sophisticated combinations of trade weights and trade price
elasticities (e.g., MEI*{ weights). Inflation differentials could be
measured by consumer price indices, or more likely, by indices of
either unit labor cost's or prices in manufacturing.
The PPP approach carries the advantage of simplicity and ease of
computation. Arrayed against this, however, are several rather serious
disadvantagesfor use in a target zone context.
First, PPP will be a suitable indicator of the equilibrium exchange
rate when all disturbances between the base and current periods are
monetary in origin. In this case, general price levels will be
altered but relative prices (of imports and exports, or of tradables
and nontradables, or of individual tradables like food or fuel) will
not. In contrast, when disturbances are real and do alter relative
prices,then it will be desirable to have a departure from PPP (i.e.,
a change in the real exchange rate). This point is relevant because
there have been numerous real disturbances over the past 13 years of
managed floating (e.g., large changes in oil prices, changes in savings
and Investment propensities), and thereis little reason tobelieve
that such real disturbances will not occur in the future. This means
that if a PPP formula were used to compute the equilibrium rate in a
target zone, there would probably have to be a manual "override option"—28—
to permit departures from PPP whenever there were real disturbances to
the system. But this override option robs PH' of its simplicity and
computational facility.
A second disadvantage of the PPP approach is that actual exchange
rates of major currencies during the l970s and early 1980s have not
followed the paths implied by PPP——and for both the short and
long run. 22 To most observers, the empirical failure of PPP in the
short run is attributable to an intrinsic difference between exchange
rates and prices of national outputs. The former are jumpy, forward—
looking, auction prices that move in anticipation of future events
whereas the latter are sticky, backward—looking, administered prices that
may largely reflect previous events. In the long run, structural changes
and permanent supply shocks nay cause PH' to miss the mark.In any
case, the poor empirical track record of PPP suggests that exchange rate
forecasts based on PPP might not be credible to market participants.
A third difficulty with PPP is that the results themselves appear to
be quite sensitive to the choice among alternative price indices and base
periods to the income levels and income growth rates of the countries
involved in the comparison (i.e., the so—called productivity—bias in PPP)
23 and to the level of aggregation in the data (manufacturing versus the
entire economy). 24 Such sensitivity, in turn, makes it difficult to
speak with confidence about all but very large misalignments.
A second method of calculating equilibrium exchange rates for
target zones is to employ an estimated structural model of exchange
rate determination that relates the (nominal) exchange rate to— 29—
"fundamentals."Twopopularsuch models are the monetary model and
the portfolio balance model. In themonetary model, the change in the
exchange rate is usually explained by changes in theratio of hone to
foreign money supplies and by changes in theratio of the demand for
money at home to that abroad (where the demand formoney is a function
of, inter alia, real income, nominal interestrates). The portfolio
balance model relates the (nominal) exchangerate to the stocks of
assets denominated in the hone and foreigncurrencies (where these asset
stocks include money supplies as well asinterest—bearing securities).
Since the stocks of financial assets can berelated to cumulative budget
deficits, cumulative current account imbalances,open market operations,
and exchange market intervention, theportfolio balance model provides a
direct role for such policies in influencingexchange rates.In the
monetary model, such policies affect exchange rates only to theextent
that they affect the supply or demand formoney.
Given estimates for such a structural model ofexchange rates, the
equilibrium exchange rate could be defined as the ratecorresponding
to the desired path of the explanatory fundamentals inthe equation
(i.e., money supplies, real income, interestrates, budget positions).
This estimate of the equilibrium nominalexchange rate, combined with
some assumed consistent path for prices at home and abroad, couldthen
be translated into an estimate of the equilibriumreal exchange rate.
This structural approach has three advantages: (i) itis forward—
looking and thus compatible with the intrinsic nature ofthe price
behavior of such assets as securities denominated indifferent currencies;30 —
(ii)it provides a direct link between macroeconomic policyvariables and
exchange rates; and (iii) it recognizes that in today'sworld of high
international mobility of capital, the proximate determinantsof exchange
rates, at least in the short run, probablylie in asset markets rather
than goods markets. At the same time, the structural exchangerate
equation approach is subject to at least twoserious deficiencies.
The most serious shortcoming is that all knownstructural models
of exchange rate determination have been shown to have verylimited
forecasting ability.In fact, extensive empirical testing over the
past few years has demonstrated that theout—of—sample performance of
structural exchange rate models is frequently no betterthan that
yielded by naive" models (e.g., a random—walk model).25 with the
benefit of hindsight, it seems that an important reasonfor the poor
performance of the various models is the natureof exchange rates as
asset prices. As indicated above, exchange rates are verysensitive to
expectations concerning future events and policies.Periods that are
dominated by rumors, announcements, and "news" whichalter expectations
are likely to induce a relatively large degreeof exchange rate vola-
tility. Since by definition "news" cannotbe predicted on the basis of
past information, it follows that byand large the resulting fluctuations
of exchange rates are unpredictable. In a way,this asset market per-
spective suggests that one should not expect tobe able to forecast accu-
rately exchange rate changes with theaid of simple structural models.
The role of the simple structural models is to accountfor the systematic
component of the evolution of exchangerates. In cases where the systematic,—31—
predictable component is relatively small, one may expect to accountfor
only a small fraction of the variability of exchange rates. The main
message of all this is that target zones based on exchangerate forecasts
from such models night not carry sufficient credibility to act as an
anchor.
Another problem with the structural exchange rate models is that
the explanatory variables can be difficult to measure and interpret on
a timely basis. For example, the portfolio balance model requires
measurement of asset stocks by currency, by country of issuance, and
by residence of the holder. But such data only becoute available much
after the fact and estimates based on extrapolation of benchmark figures
may introduce substantial error into the calculations. Similarly,in
the monetary model one faces the problems of which monetary aggregate
to use (in view of financial market innovations) •howto forecast that
aggregate over the relevant tine horizon, and how to distinguishshort—
term movements in velocity from trends. For these reasons, the prospects
of obtaining timely forecasts (target zones) from these models are not
encouraging.
The third method for calculating equilibrium exchange rates is the
underlying balance approach. In this approach, the (real) equilibrium
exchange rate is defined as the rate that would make the
'underlying"
current account (i.e., the actual current account adjusted for temporary
factors) equal to "normal" net capital flows during the next twoorthree
years, given (i) anticipated macroeconomic policiesin the subject— 32—
countries,(ii) the delayed effects of past exchange rate changes, and
(iii) a number of other expected developments.Furthermore, the equality
between underlying current accounts and normal capital flowsmust not be
achieved either by wholesale unemployment, or by artificial incentives
to incoming or outgoing capital, or by undue restrictions on trade. 26
If after accounting for these factors, "underlying" currentaccounts are
calculated to be quite different from "normal" capital flows, theimpli-
cation is that either planned macroeconomic policies orpresent exchange
rates need to change to prevent such undesirable balance ofpayments
scenarios from taking place.
This underlying balance approach to exchange rate assessmentwas
developed by the Fund staff in the early l970s (see IMP (1984b));
it similarly serves as the framework for calculation of•misaligninents"
in Williamson (1935). The inputs for the calculations come from various
sources. Estimates of "anticipated macroeconomic policies," and their
associated real growth and inflation paths, can be obtained from national
projections or from the Fund's world economic outlook projection's.
Estimates of "normal" net capital flows typically come from an analysis
of past trends adjusted for expected future structural developments
(e.g., capital liberalization measures). Finally, estimates of the
effect of exchange rate changes on current accounts can hederived, for
example, from either of the Fund's two operating trade models, namely
the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERN) or the World TradeModel
(WTM). 27— 33—
Forapplication in a system of target zones, the underlyingbalance
approach carries three advantages. First, it recognizes that judgments
about the appropriateness of current exchange rates cannot be divorced
from either future anticipated macroecononic policies, or from delayed
effects of past exchange rates that are not yet visible but are likely
to emerge in the future, or from particular factors (e.g., dockstrikes)
that are temporary in nature. In this sense, it not only focusesattention
on the root cause ofmisalignment(i.e., inappropriate policies) but also
addressesthe "time dimension" in the misalignment problem.
Second,the underlying balance approach appreciates that a desirable
or sustainable payments position need not imply a zero currentaccount
balance. Specifically, it recognizes that a country with a relatively
low domestic savings rate but with relatively attractive domestic
investment opportunities can run a persistent current account deficit
by drawing on foreign savings if (i) it invests those foreign savings
wisely; and (ii) the return on domestic investments is not artificially
high (because of special incentives for or restrictions oninternational
capital flows, or because of unsustainably high government borrowing).
A third advantage of the underlying balance approach is that, at
least in principle, it ensures that the computed equilibrium exchange
rates are consistent across countries.28 This is so because the trade
models that underlie such exchange rate calculations are specifically
designed to be used in a multilateral setting. Since target zones must
be mutually consistent, this is not a trivial consideration.— 34—
Movingto the negative side of the ledger, the underlying balance
approach is subject to a number of problems.
First and foremost, the concept of "normal" net privatecapital
flows is a particularly ambiguousone; yet estimates of these capital
flows play a key role in the estimate of the equilibrium realexchange
rate. The reasons why the concept is so slippery include thefollowing:
(1) While private saving rates are reasonably stable over time and
across countries, the geographic loci of perceived investmentopportu-
nities are not; the latter depend on a wide set of expected policies in
both the origin and host countries——many of whichcan change precipi-
tately. (ii) Various controls on capital flows make it difficult to
determine what is "normal," especially when these controlschange over
tine. (iii) Acquisition of foreign assets subjects the holder to risks
(e.g., expropriation risk) that are fundanentally different from those
associated with domestic assets, and therefore consideration of such
risks may limit exposure even when average real rates ofreturn on foreign
assets are high. (iv) Large changes in government fiscal positions, and
drastic shifts in private portoflio composition, can lead tolarge swings
in observed capital flows, the duration of which is highly uncertain.
The end result of all this is that estimates of "normal netcapital
flows for the likely participants in a target zone system are subject
to a considerable margin of error.
A second problem with the underlying balance approach is that it is
not well suited to the analysis and diagnosis of the mix of macroeconomic
policies. In general, macroeconomic policies influence the equilibrium—35—
exchange rate in this approach via their effect on anticipated real
output and inflation paths over the next two to three years. Thus, the
model will produce different estimates of the equilibrium exchange rate
for different real output and inflation paths. But it cannot distinguish
among policy mixes that yield the same output and inflation paths.This
must be regarded as a shortcoming since the cause of misalignment may
lie more with an inappropriate mix of policies (e.g., overly loose fiscal
policy cum overly tight monetary policy) than with an inappropriate stance
of policies (e.g., excessively expansionary monetary and fiscal policy).
The third difficulty with the underlying balance approach is that
it is operationally complex. Ihta requirements are substantial, computa-
tions depend on large—scale trade models, the rationale behind some of
the calculations is not transparent, and estimates of some key parameters
(e.g., short—run and long—run tradeelasticities) are uncertain. 29
All of this, in turn, might be burdensome for agreement on, and continuous
revision of, target zones.
Fourth, the large—scale trade models that are likely to be used in
this approach do not pay sufficient attention to either financial var—
lables or to the important distinction between expected and unexpected
values of key economic variables. These omissions render this approach
somewhat remote from the mechanisms usually associated with the deter-
mination of market exchange rates. Therefore, target zones based on
forecasts from the underlying balance approach may again be questioned
by market participants.— 36—
Tosummarize, each of the three methods of calculating equilibrium
exchange rates has strengths and weaknesses. It might, however, not be
necessary to follow just one method. Instead, one could construct a
consensus" forecast on the basis of estimates from several methods.
Such an exercise would also provide information on the comparative
performance of each method which, in turn, could aid in the ultimate
selection of the proper calculation method. Finally, in appraising the
methods of calculating equilibrium exchange rates, it is important to
recognize that such methods are already being applied to some degree
whenever the Fund "takes a view" on the appropriateness of majorcurrency
exchange rates. In this sense, the problems raised are not new ones.
The differences are that in a system of target zones (especially the
"harder" versions) the method of calculating equilibrium exchange
rates would be more explicit and subject to greater scrutiny, and that
the results of such calculations would be shared with the market.
11.2: What currencies should be included in the system of target zones?
Mother central issue for a system of target zones is the number
and choice of currencies to be included. Several considerations seem
paramount.
For administrative efficiency, it is desirable that member-
ship should be kept fairly small. This is because the complexity of
negotiations, and the danger of conflicts that might bring about a
collapse of the system, can be said to increase rapidly as the number
of partners rises.This position is consistent with the view that
centralized management of exchange rates is feasible only when the— 37—
n.nberof decisions to be made is reasonably small. 30 In this connection,
it is useful to recall that although a large number of currencies were
managed under the Bretton Woods system, countries took the initiative
forpar value changes, the Fund could only concur with or objectto par
valuechanges proposed by a member, and par values were changed rather
infrequently. 31 similarly, the present system of managed floating is a
decentralized system that permits "market—based" decisions to act as a
safety valve when more centralized decisions about adjustment responsi-
bilities and exchange rate alignments do not prove possible. In short,
since international decision—making on exchange rates is likely to be
difficult, one should not unduly burden the system with too many players.
For a target zone system to have an appreciable impact on
conditions in foreign exchange markets, it is desirable that the member-
ship include major currency countries. Although the vast majorityof
countries currently maintain some form of "pegged" exchange arrangements,
the largest trading countries maintain either "limited flexibility"
(e.g., the EMS) or "more flexible" exchange arrangements, including
'•independent floating" by four of the largest industrialS countries
(Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).32
Reflecting this, it has been estimated that about two thirds to four
fifths of world trade is conducted at floating rates.33 The key to
progressing toward more fixity in exchange rates therefore lies notin
inducing many countries to adopt constraints on exchange rate flexi—
bility——thisis already a fact of life——but rather in inducing the largest— 38—
tradingcountries to accept such constraints. This consideration hasno
doubt influenced the leading proposals(e.g., Roosa (1984)) that the key
members of a target zone be either the threelargest industrial countries
or the Group of Five (or perhaps Group of Seven)countries.
A further consideration is the characteristics of thepotential
member countries. These characteristics,emphasized in the literature
on so—called optimal currency areas, are relevant not forchoosing the
right number of countries for a target zone but ratherfor assessing
the likely membership.
The more important country characteristicsate the following:
(1) The openness of the economy. This criterionsuggests that
relatively open economies should prefer greater fixity ofexchange
rates because exchange rate fluctuations inducelarger domestic price
changes in more open economies, thereby complicating the taskof
domestic stabilization policies.
(ii) The size of the economy. Small economiesare said to be
more inclined to join currency unions because, in the absence ofsuch
monetary integration, their effective economic size would besuboptimal.
This of course begs the question of to whom topeg.
(iii) The degree of commodity diversification.Highly diversified
economies are deemed more likely candidates forgreater fixity of exchange
rates because their diversification provides some naturalinsulation
against a variety of shocks; hence, there is less need for theinsulation
properties of a flexible exchange rate.— 39—
(iv)The degree of factor mobility. Countries between which there
is a high degree of factor mobility are viewed as better candidates for
currency unions because factor mobility provides a substitute for exchange
rate flexibility in promoting external adjustment. Since factor mobility
ta in turn likely to diminish with geographic distance, this criterion
is often used to justify currency unions between small neighboring states.
Cv) Similarity of inflation rates. The argument here is that
countries with similar tastes for inflation——and more important, similar
histories of inflation——will tend to prefer greater fixity of exchange
rates. There is however a chicken—and—egg problem: do member countries
of a currency union have similar inflation rates because they belong
to the union, or have they joined the union because of their similar
capacities to combat inflation?
Obviously, these country characteristics do not all point in the
same direction. For example, the criteria of openness, size, and factor
mobility suggest that the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Japan would have relatively weak incentives to join a target zone,
relative say, to the smaller European countries that are members of
the EMS. th the other hand, the criteria of commodity diversification
and similarity of inflation rates lean perhaps the other way.
A final consideration is the relationship to existing currency
blocs. In thinking about the potential membership of a target zone
system, it is important to recognize that most countries are already
part of a currency bloc, be it via pegging to a single currency or cur-
rency basket, or via participation in an arrangement with limited exchange— 40—
rateflexibility (e.g., the EMS). This raises three points: (1) where
members of the target zone system are also members of other (regional)
currency blocs, provision would have to be made for ensuring consistency
of cross exchange rates and for coordinating intervention practices
between the "core" target zone and "satellite" currency blocs;
(ii) countries that already have non—exchange—rate linking arrangements
(e.g. a customs union) nay be reluctant to undertake additional linkages
(i.e. target zones) for fear of restricting too tightly their room for
independent action; and (iii) if the most natural and profitable oppor-
tunities for currency union are exploited first, then it is likely
that a target zone system among major currency countries nay have to
operate with more flexibility (e.g., wider margins and more frequent
revision of central rates) than satellite currency blocs.
11.3: Row wide should the target zones be and how frequently should they
be revised?
The equilibrium exchange rate——also sometimes referred to as the
central rate——represents only one of several parameters that characterize
target zones. Two others are the width of the zones surrounding the
central rates and the frequency by which the zones are revised,
What considerations bear on the determination of these latter two
parameters?
Concerning the width of the zones, four factors are relevant.
First, the zones must be wide enough to accommodate transitory distur-
bances that do not alter long—run equilibrium real exchange rates.
In this sense, the zone may be viewed as providing a buffer. The
buffer not only guards against costly shifts in resources due to— 41—
excessivelyfrequent changes in central rates butalso provides the
authorities with breathing space to sort out permanentfrom transitory
shocks. Second, the zone should be wide enough toreflect uncertainties
about the equilibrium central rate itself. Asnoted earlier, there
are various approaches to calculating thereal equilibrium exchange
rate and there are uncertainties about the parametervalues in each
model. To many observers, little is gained by acting asif equilibrium
exchange rates could be assessed with great precision.Recognizing
this, some proposals for target zones recommendinitial zones on the
order of 10 percentage points on each side of the central rate(see,
for example, Williamson (1985)). The third factor tobe considered
is speculation. A well—known weakness of fixed exchangerates is
that frequently they offer speculators "one—waybets" about the
direction of changes in parities. Target zones musttherefore be
sufficiently wide to allow for occasional changesin central rates
within the zone without provoking one—way speculation.Fourth, if
centralrates were specified in terms of a numeraire currency,then
the width of the target zone linking nonnumerairecurrencies will
ingeneral be different to that betweeneach currency and the
numeraire.
Also, there is no reason why thewidth of the zones should be
constant over time. For example, if uncertaintyabout the equilibrium
real exchange rate and about the nature ofdisturbances diminished
with experience, then narrower zonescould be adopted. On the other— 42—
hand,if turbulence increased over time, widerzones could be adopted.
Finally, as a corollary of the abovearguments, there is no logical
presumption that the width of the zone should be thesane for all
members. In this connection, it is relevantto note the experience
of the EMS in which the currency of Italy,a country that has had
relatively high inflation in the past, is subject to widermargins
than other currencies. Similarly, it has beensuggested that if the
United Kingdom were to join the EMS, specialprovision should be
made in the form of wider margins for thepound sterling to reflect
the influence of oil price developments on theexchange rate.
Turning to the frequency of adjustment, a number of points need
to be considered. To begin with, the frequency withwhich the central
rates (and zones around then) are adjusted should reflect thefrequency
of changes in real economicconditions, as well as, of course, the size
of inflation differentials across member countries.Examples of changes
in real economic conditions would includepermanent changes in the
terms of trade, continuing intercountry differences in laborproductivity,
and intercountry shifts in saving and investmentpropensities. Because
such changes in real economic conditions generally donot occur at close
intervals, they are unlikely to induce frequent changes in thetarget
zones. The size of inflation differentials dependsprimarily on how
successful target zones are in inducing harmonization ofmembers' macro-
economic and structural policies, particularlymonetary policy. The
second factor governing the desired frequency ofadjustment is the flexi-
bility of macroeconomic policy instruments. Specifically, sincea change— 43—
inreal economic conditions can be reconciled either by a change in
macroeconomic policies with an unchanged zone or by a change in the zone
with unchanged policies, it follows that inflexible policies call for
higher frequency of zone adjustment, and vice—versa. Third, there is
the credibility issue. Frequent revisions in the zones reduce credibility
of the zones and thereby reduce their value as an anchor for expectations.
On the other hand, frequent changes in macroeconomic policies designed
to sustain the zones may also reduce credibility——but this time of the
policies. Therefore,the optimal frequency of adjustment from a credi-
bility viewpoint involves balancing between these two considerations.
Fourth, some have argued that if target zones are adjusted frequently
for inflation differentialsand the need for balance of payments adjust-
ment, speculative attacks will be discouraged, since they are motivated
by large discrete changes in exchange rates. Fifth, the frequency of
adjustment must obviously be constrained by the availability of the data
necessary for computations.
11.4: How would exchange rates be kept within the zones and with what
consequences for other policy objectives?
For a system of target zones to operate successfully, it is neces-
sary that exchange rates be kept within the agreed zones, atleast most
of the time. But how would participating countries assure this result?
Three policy instruments should be considered.
The most obvious instrument is domestic monetary policy.
Indeed, as indicated in Section I, a differentiating characteristic
of target zones is that the authorities pay more attention to the
exchange rate in the conduct of domestic monetary policy than they do— 44—
underthe present system of managed floating. What thismeans is
that participating members will have to seekgreater coordination of
monetary policies, with a consequent reduction in the ability to inde-
pendently control the money supply. For example, a member ofthe system
that sees its nominal exchange rate fall to the bottomof the zone would
be expected to slow its money growth rate andto increase its domestic
interest rate vis—'a—vis those of other members; 35 in thisway, it
would induce an appreciation in its nominalexchange rate, thereby
keeping its exchange rate within the target zone.Assuming that the
pass—through of nominal exchange rate changes into domestic prices is
less than complete, the samemonetary policy action would allow the
member to satisfy its target for the real exchange rateas well. 36
There is little doubt about the ability of major industrialcoun-
tries to influence nominal and real exchange rates in themedium term
using domestic monetary policy. 37 The key question concerns thewillingness
to do so given the implied reduction in their ability to thenuse domestic
monetary policy for internal objectives. To Dany observers, it is simply
naive to believe that the United States, Japan, and the FederalRepublic
of Germany would be willing to override internal objectives forexchange
rate targets in the formulation of domestic monetary policy. Underthis
view, "soft" target zones are the strongest commitment one canreasonably
envisage for the three largest potential members. Othersargue, however,
that the independence of monetary policy is far from complete underthe
present system, even for those countries classified by the Fundas— 45—
"independentlyfloating." To take but one recent example, the U.K. author-
ities reacted to the large decline in the dollar/pound rate in early
1985 by encouraging large increases in domestic interest rates——and this
even though there was strong domestic pressure for lower interest rates
to help reduce unemployment. For this reason, supporters of target zones
argue that all countries already have implicit target zones beyond which
they are willing to sacrifice internal objectives for the exchange rate.
It is argued therefore that the loss of monetary independence at the
margin would be minimal.
A second possible policy instrument for keeping exchange rates
within target zones is sterilized exchange market intervention (i.e.,
exchange market intervention that leaves the monetary base unchanged).
Its main attraction is that, if effective, it wouldpermitthe author-
ities to influence exchange rates while simultaneously maintaining
control of the domestic money supply.
Unfortunately, the prognosis for using sterilized exchange market
intervention as the primary instrument for controlling exchange rates
is not favorable. The Jurgensen Report (1983), for example, supports
the view that sterilized intervention by itself is unlikely to be an
effective tool for influencing the level of the exchange rate over the
medium or long—term. 38 Similarly, recent empirical work on exchange
rate determination indicates that while domestic and foreign currency
assets may well be imperfect substitutes——a necessary condition for
sterilized exchange market intervention to be effective——risk premiums
in exchange markets are not well explained by relative asset supplies— 46—
(thevery variables affected by exchange marker intervention). 39 In
short, the effects of sterilized intervention on marketexchange rates
are likely to be small and uncertain in size.Nevertheless, sterilized
interventionmay have a useful role to play indampening short—term
volatilityofexchange rates, in countering disorderly marketconditions,
in complementing and supporting other policies, andin expressing an
attitude toward exchange markets.
Capital controls represent a third instrument for keepingexchange
rates within target zones. This is however generally notregarded as an
attractive option for two reasons. First, evenaggressive capital control
programs, such as those of the early 1970s, were not able to stem private
capital flows, and the subsequent development of offshore bankingmarkets
suggests even lower effectiveness today. Second, capital controlprograms
are most effective in altering exchange rates when they cover alltypes
of capital transactions. But in thatcase, there is no presunption that
the resource allocation costs of impeding the internationalflow of
capital would be less serious than departures of exchange rates from
the zones themselves.
The preceding discussion suggests that the primary instrument
for keeping exchange rates within target zones islikely to be monetary
policy. If this is so, then a second relevant questionemerges: with
monetary policy geared more to external objectives, what policy instru-
ments will be assigned to internal balance (i.e., pricestability and
high employment)?— 47—
Onelogical answer is fiscal policy. 40 Here, the key question
is not so much whether fiscal policy can affect aggregate demand in najor
industrial countries. Experience suggests that it can. Rather, the
issue is whether fiscal policy is a sufficiently flexible policy instrument
to be used for stabilization policy in a world in which some countries
have medium—term targets for reducing the share of government expenditure
in overall economic activity, some are contemplating large structural
changes in their tax system, some are commited to given levels of
social programs and defense spending, some are wedded to preannounced
public sector borrowing requirements, and some are facing legislatures
that can take years (not months) to enact significant cuts in budget
deficits.
A second policy option (favored for example by Meade (1984)) is
to use labor—market policy for internal balance. In brief, the idea
is to lower the money wage rate in any sector which has excess supply
of labor and to raise it where there is excess demand. The problem,
recognized by supporters, is that the implementation of such a policy
would involve the substantial reform of labor market institutions.
In short, although sound in its internal logic, it begs the central
question of how to bring such a labor market policy into being in
advanced industrial economies. The slow progress in reducing structural
rigidities in European labor markets bears testimony to the difficulties
involved.
In sum, because of the limitations of other policy instruments,
monetary policy is often called on to serve both external and internal— 48—
objectives.If a move to target zones were made, it would require shift-
ing more of the emphasis toward external objectives. This might not
create a major problem if all members of the target zone geared monetary
policy toward price stability; or if coordinated, sterilized exchange
market intervention could ease the external obligations of monetary
policy; or if fiscal policy could be made flexible enough to deal
effectively with internal balance. itwever, since none of these
three outcomes is likely to be fully realized, members of a target zone
system would probably still be faced with serious conflicts between
external and internal balance. At the same time, the constraints on
macroeconomic policies induced by a target zone system might make a
contribution to the realization of these three outcomes.
III. Postcript
This paper, along with others that examined issues raised in the
reports on the international monetary system presented by the 1puties
of the Group of Ten and Group of Twenty—Four, was discussed by the
Fund's cecutive Board in early 1986. Since then, efforts to improve
the functioning of the exchange rate system have centered on enhancing
economic policy coordination among the largest economies and on
strengthening the multilateral setting for Fund surveillance, includ-
ing the formulation of a set of "objective indicators."
At its meeting on April 9—10, 1986, the Interim Committee agreed
that "if better exchange rate performance were to be achieved on a
durable basis, it would be of the essence that economic policies be
conducted in a sound and mutually consistent way and that exchange rate— 49—
considerationsshould play their part in those policies" (International
Monetary Fund (1986), p. 115). The Committee also reconfirmed the key
role that Fund surveillance needs to play in the functioning of the
international monetary system. "To improve the multilateral setting
for surveillance, the Committee asked the Executive Board to consider
ways in which its regular reviews of the world economic situation could
be further adapted to improve the scope for discussing external imbal—
ances, exchange rate developments, and policy interactions among members.
An approach worth exploring further wastheformulation of a set of
objective indicators related to policy actions and economic performance,
having regard to a medium—term framework. Such indicators might help
to identify a need for discussion of econonic policies" (p. 115).
The leaders of the seven major industrial countries, meeting on
May 4—6, 1986 in Tokyo at the twelfth annual economic summit, reinforced
this commitment to closer coordination of economic policies. They asked
that their finance ministers meet at least once a year to review their
individual economic objectives and forecasts collectively, and that
they use a set of quantitative indicators of economic policies and
performance with a particular view to examining their mutual compati-
bility" (International Monetary Fund, 1986, p. 145). They welcomed the
recent examples of improved coordination among the Group of Five
countries——including the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985——but
felt that additional measures were needed "to ensure that procedures
for effective coordination of international economic policy are
strengthened further" (ibid, p. 157). Toward this goal, the leaders,— 50—
togetherwith the representatives of the European Community parti-
cipating in the meeting, reaffirmed their intention "to cooperate
with the IMP in strengthening multilateral surveillance, particularly
among the countries (the Group of Five) whose currenciesconstitute
the SDR" (ibid, p. 157). Further, they asked that in conducting such
surveillance and in conjunction with the Managing Director of the IMF,
account be taken of "such indicators as growth rates of grossnational
product (GNP), interest rates, inflation rates, unemployment rates,
ratios of fiscal deficits to GNP, current account and trade balances,
money growth rates, international reserve holdings,and exchange rates"
(ibid, p. 157).
In July 1986, the Fund's Executive Board discussed a staff paper
on "Indicators Relating to Policy Actions and EconomicPeforniance." 41
This was followed in September by the Executive Board's discussion of the
staff's world economic outlook exercise, the published version of which
appeard in October,In the context of analyzing the medium—term prospects
of industrial countries, that exercise contains a section which reviews
certain potential sources of tension in the interaction of economic
developments and considers their implications for the stance of policies.
SThen the Interim Committee next met on September 28, 1986 in
Washington, it once again focused, inter alia, on the use of indicators
in surveillance. The committee agreed that "a key focus of indicators
should be on points of interaction among national economies, in parti-
cular developments affecting the sustainability of balance of payments— 51—
positions,and on the policies underlying them" (International Monetary
Fund, 1986, p. 309). The Committee also asked the Funds Executive
Board to develop further the application of indicators in the context
both of the period consultations with individual member countries and
of the World Economic Outlook so as to facilitate the nultilateraj.
appraisal and coordination of economic policies" (ibid).— 52—
FOOTNOTES
lAt its meeting in Seoul, Korea on October 6—7, 1985, the Interim
Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary
Fund requested the Executive Board of the Fund '.. . tostudy the issues
raised in these reports (the reports on the international monetary
system presented by the Deputies of the Group of Ten and the Deputies
of the Group of Twenty—Four) with a view to facilitating a substantial
consideration by the Committee at its next meeting." This paper is
one of the series of papers prepared in late 1985 in response to
that request.
2Some other proposals for improving exchange rate stability are
analyzed in Crockett and Goldstein (1987).
31n the Group of Ten report, target zones are described as follows:
the authorities concerned would define wide margins around an
adjustable set of exchange rates devised to be consistent with a sus-
tainable pattern of balances of payments" (par. 31). (See International
Monetary Fund (...).).
4Anotherway of summarizing the difference between a system of target
zones and the present system of managed floating would be as follows.
Under target zones, authorities must come to a mutually agreed view on
the appropriate zones for major currency exchange rates. In contrast,
under the present system, authorities have not generally expressed
their own view on appropriate zones for exchange rates, let alone come
to a common view with other authorities.— 53—
5Targetzones are intended to reflect estimates of real equilibrium
exchange rates because it is the real exchange rate that is most
relevant for resource allocation decisions and for balance of payments
adjustment; however, it is usually assumed that for operational purposes
these real rate calculations would be translated into nominal exchange
rate zones. The assumption is that the authorities can alter real rates
by operating on nominal rates. Also, whereas a breach of the target
zone is expected to initiate a review of the whole range of a country's
macroeconomic and structural policies, most target zone proposals assume
that monetary policy will carry the primary responsibility for managing
the exchange rate.
6lnternational Monetary Fund (1974b).
7Existing procedures do not rely on the assessment of appropriate zones
but rather use as a starting point the last occasion on which exchange
rate developments were brought to the attention of the Executive Board.
8Coordination may be thought of as encompassing all international
influences on domestic policymaking; see Polak (1981). It might be
regarded as the chief criticism because short—term volatility and
longer—term misalignment of exchange rates are generally regarded as
manifestations of the lack of discipline and coordination.
9See Lingerer, Evans and Nyberg (1983) for a review of the EMSexperi-
ence during the 1979—82 period.
l°International Monetary Fund (1984a).
"See, for example, Bryant (1983) and Obstfeld (1985).— 54—
l2Thisassumes that such an order of magnitude is compatible over
the long run with a reasonable buildup of debt and with an acceptable
maturity profile.
l3Critics of the present system might reply that the Group of Five
New York agreement was a reaction to the absence of coordination and the
large misaliguments fostered by the present system.
'4See solomon (1982) on this point.
'5Some observers also doubt whether in practice quiet zones could he
quiet for long. They argue that it is not possible for the Fund and
national authorities to know what target zones are without this inform—
ation leaking out.
'6SeeCalvo(1983).
'7See International Monetary Fund (1984c), Tables 2 and 3.
'8See Adams and Gros (1986) for an analysis of the dangers for
inflation of real exchange rate targets.
l9SeePolak(1981).
20Most proposals for target zones (e.g., Williamson (1985)) assume
that fiscal policy is not well suited to be an instrument of exchange
rate policy because it is too inflexible and because its (alleged)
comparative advantage (vis—'a—vis monetary policy) is in influencing
domestic demand rather than the balance of paents.
21See Ijngerer (1984) for a discussion of the implications of the
EMS for the likely success of a return to a system of fixed hut adjust-
able exchange rates.— 55—
22SeeFrenkel (l981a). Of course, to the extent that actual exchange
rates have been subject to misalignnents, one would not want the actual
ratesto closely follow a PPP path. However, divergencies from PPP have
been so marked and so persistent as to raise doubts about the credibility
ofexchange rate forecasts based on PPP.
23See Balassa (1964).
24SeeInternational Monetary Fund (1984b).
25Meese and Rogoff (1982) and Isard (1986).
26This description of the real equilibrium exchange rate is a close
relative of those outlined in Nurkse (1945), InternatIonal Monetary
Fund(1970), and the Group of twenty—Four Report, para. 69.
27See Artus and Mccuirk (1981) and Deppler and Ripley (1978).
2SThis advantage must be qualified in viewof the birge global dis-
crepancy incurrent account positions. This discrepancy makes it harder
to reach agreement on what consltutes an equilibrium pattern of current
account positions.
29See, for example, Goldstein and Khan (1984).
300f course, exchange rates established in a target zone would have
clear implications for nonparticipants to which they would have to
adjust and/or react.
31The Bretton Woods system also had the U.S. dollar as the numeraire.
With the dollar as anchor, exchange rate decisions could take place one—
at—a—time. When this was no longer the case (e.g., August—December 1971),
negotiations over exchange rates were much more difficult. It is not
clear what currency or currency—basket would serve as numeraire in a
targetzone.— 56—
321tis worth recalling that the currencies of EMS members float
against currencies of many nonmembers.
338ee International Monetary Fund (1984c) and the Group of Ten
Report, para. 9.
34A counterargument is that changes in macroeconomic policies in
response to real changes in the economy could act at times to enhance
the credibility of policy if they were perceived as responsive to these
changes.
351t is not clear what form monetary intervention would take.
Members could intervene in domestic financial markets (exchanging
money for debt of the same currency of denomination) or in interna-
tional financial markets (exchanging monies of different currency
denomination). If the latter were envisaged, questions could arise
about the adequacy of intervention assets and about sterilization
operations.
36Obstfeld (1985) reports that month—month correlations between
nominal and real exchange rates for the 1976—85 period were above
0.95 for the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the deutsche mark.
371n the long run (say, three to five years) ,theability to
use monetary policy to affect the real exchange rate will be more
modest. Also, even in the medium term, this ability will be lower
for the smaller, more open, more highly indexed industrial countries
than for the larger, less open, less indexed ones. See Goldstein and
Khan (1984) for a survey of estimates of these "pass—through" effects.— 57—
38"Intervention will normally be useful only when complementing
and supporting other policies." JurgenAen Report (1983),p.
39See, for example, Dooley and Isard (1983).
40Fiscal. policy also has a role to play inachieving a given real
exchange rate on a sustainable basis.
41SeeCrockettand Goldstein (1987) for a published version of that
paper.— 58—
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